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This paper reports laboratory experiments investigating behavior when players may make 
inferences about the intentions behind others’ prior actions based on higher- or lower-accuracy 
information about those actions.  We investigate a trust game with first mover trembling, a game 
in which nature determines whether the first mover’s decision is implemented or reversed.  The 
results indicate that second movers give first movers the benefit of the doubt.  However, first 
movers do not anticipate this response.  Ultimately, it appears that subjects are thinking on at 
least three levels when making decisions: they are concerned with their own material well being, 
the trustworthiness of their counterpart, and how their own actions will be perceived.    
 
1. Introduction 
It is well established that individuals in laboratory games do not always pursue their own 
maximum monetary payoff.  In the ultimatum game, materially self-interested second movers 
should accept any positive payoff and thus materially self-interested first movers should offer the 
smallest possible positive amount (or zero).  However, more equal splits are frequently proposed 
and positive offers are often rejected.1  In an attempt to understand such behavior researchers 
hypothesize that subjects may attribute intentions to actions.2  For example, a minimal proposal 
might be considered greedy by a second mover, thus prompting rejection as a form of 
punishment.  A first mover may avoid making a minimal proposal in order to try to avoid 
rejection, or because of altruistic preferences, or both.  
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) introduced the investment game, which unlike the 
ultimatum game has a mutually-beneficial, cooperative outcome.  In the investment game and 
the related trust game described below, a first mover can forgo a certain payoff in favor of a 
larger total payoff that will be allocated by a paired second mover.  While material self-interest 
predicts that the second mover will keep everything, and thus the first mover should not forgo 
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the certain payoff, more cooperative behavior is frequently observed.  Berg, et al. found that 28 
of 32 first movers sent more than the minimum positive amount of money and 11 of the 28 
paired second movers returned a greater amount than was received.  This led Berg, et al. to 
conclude that cooperation was a “primitive” aspect of behavior.  Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and 
Boeing (2000) among many others find the behavioral pattern to be robust to various treatments.  
However, Cox and Deck (2005) find that the level of social distance in the experiment protocol 
can affect second mover behavior in the trust game.3  Similarly, in ultimatum games negative 
reciprocity or punishment is found to be dependent upon the context in which the game is 
played.4  
This literature suggests that choices made by individuals depend in part on the perceived 
intentions of other players and how people expect their decisions to be interpreted.5  Generous 
actions by the first mover in the investment game are often interpreted as trusting while the 
second movers’ sharing the larger total payoff is often interpreted as positive reciprocity.    
However, to directly examine the significance of motives one needs to verify that behavior 
differs for the same nominal payoff decision in different circumstances.  To accomplish this one 
can decompose a game into a series of related games, some with and some without the 
hypothesized motivation (see Cox 2004).6  For example Cox and Deck (2005, 2006) examine the 
trust game and the associated dictator game in which the decision maker faces the same nominal 
choices as the second mover in the trust game, as shown in Figure 1.   
In Figure 1, the numbers at the end of a branch are the dollar payoffs.  In the trust game 
tree, the top (bottom) number is the first (second) mover’s payoff.  In the dictator game tree, the 
bottom (top) is the dictator's (other subject’s) payoff.  The number at the middle of each branch 
is the number of subjects who made that choice.  Note that 8 of 24 ( %33≅ ) of the dictators 
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chose "cooperate" in the dictator game and 21 of 33 ( %64≅ ) of the second movers chose 
"cooperate" in the trust game.  Together, data from the trust and dictator games support the 
conclusion that there is significant play motivated by positive reciprocity in the trust game.  
McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (2003) find essentially the same pattern in a similar design in which 
first movers were required to play down (“choose” trust) in the involuntary trust game (see 
Figure 2).        
It is clear from previous research that perceived intentions can affect behavior.7 Data 
reported by Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) in a variation of the trust game framed as a contract 
demonstrates a similar pattern.  In their game the decision to defect by a second mover, i.e. not 
perform according to the contract, is followed by a node at which with some probability nature, 
i.e. the “legal system,” would detect defection and enforce the cooperative outcome minus a 
penalty for the second mover.  While the findings are based upon repeated play environments, 
the general result is that for both small and large probabilities of a second mover being penalized 
for defection there is considerable cooperation (75% and 86% respectively), but this is not true 
for the intermediate case (30% cooperation).8 In the low detection case one would expect at least 
as much cooperation as in the trust game given the repeated nature of the experiment and in fact 
it was.  In the high probability case, everyone regardless of their level of self-interest should 
cooperate and most did.  However, the intermediate case is basically a dictator control treatment 
in that the first mover’s decision is not a signal of trust because the legal system is sufficiently 
developed that a risk-neutral, self-interested first mover would not choose to exit.  Thus one 
would expect behavior similar to a dictator game which it was.                    
In all of the experiments discussed above subjects had complete information about the 
payoffs of all players and there was no uncertainty about what actions were selected.9   However, 
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in many naturally occurring situations players do not have such complete information.  At one 
extreme where players know only their own payoffs from each possible outcome, McCabe, 
Rassenti and Smith (1998) find that behavior closely matches the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium prediction for fully rational, exclusively self-interested agents.  Of course, in that 
setting it is not clear how to interpret the motivations or intentions of the other players.   
Our paper takes a complementary approach in which subjects have complete information 
about payoffs but there is uncertainty about what actions have been selected by others. That is, 
we ask whether people are willing to give others the benefit of the doubt.  To explore this issue 
we consider a version of the trust game, referred to as the trembling game, where there is an 
exogenously determined chance that the first mover’s decision is reversed.  When a second 
mover is called upon to make a decision in the trembling game there is some probability that the 
first mover did not actually trust the second mover.  It is our hypothesis that people who would 
select cooperate in the dictator game control treatment would do so in the trembling game as 
well.10 Similarly, we hypothesize that those who would select defect in the trust game would also 
select defect in the trembling game.11 Hence we expect this type of uncertainty to affect only 
those motivated by reciprocity, and therefore the percentage of people cooperating in the 
trembling game should be at least as great as in the dictator game but no greater than in the trust 
game.  This approach allows us to identify how unambiguous the connection between the 
decision task and the perceived intention behind another’s action leading to that task has to be in 
order to induce reciprocity.       
 
2. Experimental Design 
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One hundred and twenty subjects played the trust game shown in Figure 1, with a 25% 
chance that the first mover’s action would be reversed.  Subjects were recruited from 
undergraduate classes and were paid a $5 show up fee in addition to the payment determined by 
the outcome of the one shot game.  Each subject participated in only one session and had not 
previously participated in any similar "fairness" experiments in our laboratory.  The experiment 
procedures followed identically those of Cox and Deck (2005) except that a sheet of additional 
directions was distributed to each participant.12   This sheet read as follows. 
Additional Directions: 
Once a decision-maker 1 has made a decision by clicking on a branch and pressing send, 
that decision-maker 1 will be prompted by the computer to pick a number between 1 and 
4 including 1 and 4.   After all decision-maker 1s have selected a number, the 
experimenter will randomly draw a ball from a bingo cage.  If the number the 
experimenter draws does not match the number decision-maker 1 selected, then decision-
maker 1’s decision will remain unchanged.  However, if the number drawn by the 
experimenter is the same as the number selected by decision-maker 1, then decision-
maker 1’s choice will be reversed by the computer.  Decision-maker 2 will never know 
the number selected by the decision-maker 1 counterpart.          
 
After these additional directions were read aloud, subjects were able to ask questions 
about this procedure.  Also, the bingo cage and the numbered balls were shown to the subjects, 
and there was a trial drawing with explanation.  Thus, a second mover knew that if her paired 
first mover chose “trust” there was a 75% chance it would not be reversed and if her counterpart 
chose “exit” there was a 25% chance that it would be reversed.  
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If second movers give first movers the benefit of the doubt, behavior should be the same 
as in the regular trust game (64% cooperation).  If, on the other hand, imputation of intentions 
has to be certain to generate reciprocal behavior, one would find less cooperation than in the 
regular trust game.  If reciprocity is fragile then behavior in the (trust game with) trembling 
treatment would be similar to behavior in the dictator control treatment (33% cooperation).  
However, an obvious difference between the trembling treatment and the dictator treatment is the 
possibility of both players receiving $10.  Based on previous work, such a difference could affect 
second mover behavior.13  Therefore, we conducted another control treatment in which the move 
at the first node was determined randomly, by the flip of a coin.  Following the same procedures, 
sixty-four additional inexperienced subjects were recruited.  For this treatment the sheet of 
additional directions read as follows.         
Additional Directions: 
A Decision Maker 1 has no decision to make.  The branch selected at the Decision Maker 
1 node will be determined by a coin flip.  Decision Maker 1’s will leave this room, before 
the coin is flipped, and return to the sign-in room.  
 
After these additional directions were read aloud, subjects were able to ask questions about this 
procedure and were given the opportunity to inspect the coin. At this point the first movers 
returned to the show up room and then everyone was shown the decision tree for the trust game 
in Figure 1 and told which branch would be selected by heads or tails.14     
 
3. Results 
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 The data from the experiments are presented in Table 1 along with the data from Cox and 
Deck (2005, 2006) for comparison.  Two findings are readily apparent from the table.  First, 
behavior of second movers is virtually identical in the coin flip and dictator treatments.  One 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two proportions are the same given the p-value of 0.908 
for the two-sided z-test.15 Given that the two treatments generate the same behavior, subsequent 
analysis combines the data from these two treatments.  This finding is yet more evidence of the 
robustness of behavior in dictator games. Recall that 33% to 35% of subjects being cooperative 
was also reported by Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) and McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (2003) for 
their similar treatments discussed above.         
The second finding is that as hypothesized the cooperation rate in the trembling treatment 
nominally falls between the cooperation rates in the regular trust game and the dictator/coin flip 
treatments.  Of the 20 second movers in the trembling game who had an opportunity to choose, 
11 (or 55%) chose cooperate. This is significantly more cooperation than the 15 of 44 (or 34%) 
who cooperated in the dictator/coin flip games (p-value of 0.057 in the one-tailed z-test of equal 
proportions against the one-sided alternative).16 In contrast, the difference in cooperation 
between the trust and trembling games is not significant (p-value of 0.267 in the one-tailed z-test 
of equal proportions against the one-sided alternative).17  This suggests that while there is some 
nominal slippage in cooperation, reciprocal behavior is not fragile in this context.  That is, people 
who are conditional cooperators are willing to give others the benefit of the doubt by acting as 
though others have behaved in a manner warranting cooperation even if there is no certain 
evidence of that behavior.   
A third finding is that even though second movers do not significantly change their 
behavior with the introduction of trembling, first movers do.  In the trembling game only 20 of 
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59 (or 34% of) first movers selected trust.18  This is significantly different from the 33 of 66 (or 
50%) selecting trust in the regular version of the trust game (with a p-value of 0.069 in a two-
tailed test).19  That first movers are divided approximately equally between the two options is a 
fairly robust finding.  For example, McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003) report that 17 of 27 first 
movers trusted, behavior not significantly different from 50%.  Previous studies have not found a 
treatment effect for first movers.  For example, Cox and Deck (2005) find that switching from a 
low social distance protocol where subjects are paid in person to a high social distance protocol 
where payoffs are double blind leads to a significant decrease in cooperation but no 
corresponding decrease in trust.20   
The implication of behavior in the trembling game is that first movers seem to expect 
second movers to respond to the uncertainty by not giving the first movers the benefit of the 
doubt.  Consider the decision faced by first mover j in the trust game.  Suppose she believes that 
the second mover will select cooperate with probability jp .  If she picks exit her utility will be 
)10,10(ju  while the choice of trust will result in an expected utility of 
)40,0()1()25,15( jjjj upup −+ .  Normalizing so that 0)40,0( =ju , individual j will choose trust in 
the trust game if )25,15(/)10,10( jjj uup > .  For a materially self-interested, risk-neutral person this 
simplifies to %6615/10 =>jp , which is close to the 63.6% percent cooperation rate observed in 
the trust game.  Now consider the decision faced by first mover j in the trembling game.  
Suppose that she believes the second mover will select cooperate with probability jπ  if given the 
opportunity. Then if she picks exit her expected utility will be 
)10,10(75.0 ju )]40,0()1()25,15([25.0 jjjj uu ππ −++  while the choice of trust will result in an 
expected utility of )10,10(25.0)]40,0()1()25,15([75.0 jjjjj uuu +−+ ππ .  Again normalizing so that 
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0)40,0( =ju , we find that individual j will choose trust in the trembling game if 
)25,15(/)10,10( jjj uu>π . Thus first movers are predicted to be more or less trusting in the trust 
game than in the trembling game depending only on their expectations ( jp  or jπ ) for second 
mover behavior in the two games.  
While the observed cooperation rate in the trembling game of 55% is not significantly 
lower than the cooperation rate of 63.6% in the trust game, it is nominally lower. The 
significantly lower occurrence of the trust branch choice in the trembling game may be a 
reflection of the lower nominal rate of cooperation in that game, but it may instead be an addition 
to the growing literature on backwards induction failure in which first movers fail to correctly 
anticipate the subsequent behavior of second movers (Camerer, 2003). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 Often, when people make decisions they have imperfect information about the intentions 
behind another’s perceived action and therefore have to make inferences from what they observe.  
To explore the ramifications of this type of uncertainty in a controlled laboratory setting we 
introduce trembling into the trust game.  In this variant of the game, there is a 25% chance that 
the first mover’s action will be reversed.  This design allows us to address two important aspects 
of economic behavior.  How do people behave when they have to consider how the results of 
their imperfectly-observable actions will be perceived rather than how their actual actions would 
be perceived if they were perfectly observable?  How do people react when an observed action 
may or may not have been intentional?   
 In response to the second question, we find that second movers are willing to give the 
first mover’s the benefit of the doubt.  Behavior for second movers is approximately the same in 
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the trembling game as in the standard trust game, with a majority of the second movers who are 
given the opportunity to make a decision deciding to cooperate.  Further, it is clear that second 
movers are considering the intentions of the first movers.  When the first mover decision is 
determined randomly by the flip of a coin, the cooperation rate falls to one-third.  This is 
approximately the same cooperation rate observed in the dictator control treatment for the trust 
game as well as similar treatments reported by Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) and McCabe, 
Rigdon, and Smith (2003).               
 Even though second movers are willing to give the benefit of the doubt, the answer to the 
first question is that first movers do not anticipate this, as evidenced by the significant decrease 
in trust resulting from the introduction of trembling.  This does not necessarily mean that first 
movers expect a large shift in second mover behavior.  In the trust game a risk neutral materially 
self-interested first mover is basically indifferent between trusting and exiting given the observed 
behavior of second movers.  Thus any reduction in anticipated cooperation could lead these first 
movers to strictly prefer not trusting.  Of course subjects with altruistic preferences or ones that 
misperceives the risk of defection may continue to choose trust in the trembling treatment.  
Ultimately, the impact of first movers anticipating less cooperation is that substantially fewer 
pairs reach the cooperative outcome.   
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1 See Güth and Tietz (1990) for a survey of experimental results in ultimatum games. 
2  An alternative approach is to model utility as depending upon the monetary outcomes of 
multiple players; see for example Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999).  
However, these models have had only limited success; see Deck (2001), Engelmann and Strobel 
(2004), and Cox and Sadiraj (2005). 
3 Specifically, Cox and Deck (2005) find that second mover behavior is less cooperative when 
the experimenter does not know the identity of the subjects than when subjects receive their 
payoffs in person from the experimenters.   
4 Responses to greedy proposals in ultimatum and mini-ultimatum games have been found to 
depend on the decision context and payoff structure (see Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith 
1994 and Cox and Deck 2005).     
5 See McCabe, Smith and LePore (2000) for a general discussion of intentions and “mind 
reading.” 
6 Alternately, one can make comparisons by presenting a subject with a collection of similar 
games and observing how choices vary with the games’ payoff structures (see Falk, Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003; Güth, Huck and Müller, 2000). 
7 As noted by McCabe, Rigdon and Smith, this demonstrates a critical shortcoming in purely 
outcome-based models such as offered by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999). 
8 This discussion is based upon data from the last period in which different treatments involved 
different probabilities of detection and omits the session with fixed subject matching as those 
subjects knew they would continue to interact with each other in subsequent rounds.    
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9 Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) create uncertainty about the outcome for a given action by 
introducing a lottery, but there is no uncertainty about what action was undertaken.   
10 As discussed in the next section, there is an alternative specification for a game that one could 
argue is a more appropriate baseline than the dictator game.  As revealed in section 3, behavior 
in the dictator game and the alternative specification is indistinguishable.   
11  A referee suggested an alternative hypothesis: a second mover may feel bad that a first 
mover’s decision could be reversed and this could make the second mover more likely to 
cooperate.    
12 A copy of all directions and handouts used in this study are available from the authors upon 
request.   
13 For example, Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) find that payoffs along other branches of the 
game tree can impact behavior.     
14 In half the sessions heads corresponded to the exit branch and in the other half heads 
corresponded to the trust branch.  The terms trust, exit, cooperate, and defect were never used in 
interactions with the subjects, instead neutral language was used throughout.  Participants were 
referred to as decision makers and not players or movers.     
15 In the case of comparing two sample proportions, a z-test gives the same p-value as a 2 test.  
Here we use a two-sided test because we have no prior belief about how behavior may differ 
between these two treatments     
16 A one-tailed test is used for second mover behavior because previous research suggests a 
direction for the treatment effect as discussed in the introduction.  The treatment effect would not 
be significant based upon a two-tailed test.        
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17 The treatment effect would not be significant based on a two-tailed test either.   
18 The response from one subject in the role of a first mover was omitted from the analysis 
because that subject had previously participated in a trust game experiment.  Including this 
observation would not change the substantive conclusions drawn in the paper. 
19 In this case previous work does not suggest a specific direction for the alternative hypothesis 
and thus the question of interest is simply if there is a difference.  
20 Ortmann, Fitzgerald and Boeing (2000) find a lack of treatment effect on first mover behavior 
in a study of the investment game.    
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Table 1.  Observed Behavior in the Four Games 
 Game Trust Trembling Coin Flip Dictator 
Number 
Selecting 
Cooperate 
21 11 7 8 
Number 
Selecting 
Defect 
12 9 13 16 
Cooperation 
Percentage 
63.6% 55% 35% 33.3% 
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Figure 1.  Frequency of Actions Chosen in Cox and Deck (2005, 2006) 
Figure 2.  Frequency of Actions Chosen in McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003) 
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